Flashback: The Long Telegram

Every once in a while at least one of the pundits on the Chatty Channels appears to have a functioning grasp of the history of US / Russian relations, and a sense of how prescient former diplomats have been in the past.  Such was the case when Ambassador Kennan’s 2/22/46 “Long Telegram” was referenced.

Kennan was describing “soviet” policy in post WWII relations but he might easily have been describing current Russian foreign policy.  What are some important Russian goals? Are they similar to what Kennan listed in 1946?

“(a) Everything must be done to advance relative strength of USSR as factor in international society. Conversely, no opportunity most be missed to reduce strength and influence, collectively as well as individually, of capitalist powers.

(b) Soviet efforts, and those of Russia’s friends abroad, must be directed toward deepening and exploiting of differences and conflicts between capitalist powers. If these eventually deepen into an “imperialist” war, this war must be turned into revolutionary upheavals within the various capitalist countries.

(c) “Democratic-progressive” elements abroad are to be utilized to maximum to bring pressure to bear on capitalist governments along lines agreeable to Soviet interests.

(d) Relentless battle must be waged against socialist and social-democratic leaders abroad.”

“…deepening and exploiting of differences and conflicts between capitalist powers” isn’t far from the current Russian efforts to create divisions and undermine coalitions like NATO, the European Union, and the United Nations.  We should also notice that it was, and is, a Russian goal to create problems for western nations both “collectively as well as individually.” Then as now.   There is another paragraph which deserves reflection, and Kennan delves into the origins of Russian opposition to western nations.

“At bottom of Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.”

This analysis goes a way toward explaining the Russian efforts to control news, indulge in state propaganda instead of a free press, and its propensity to destroy those who would provide information about Russian machinations to western authorities.  [EveningStandard] Witness the changing Russian stories about the Salisbury Attack: (i) It wasn’t Russia; (ii) If it was a Russian nerve agent it wasn’t us; (iii) We don’t know if it’s Russian because the British won’t share all the elements of their investigation; (iv) It’s a false flag operation by the British themselves. As the British Prime Minister explained, there really is no other plausible narrative concerning the Salisbury Attack other than Russian operations.

Substitute “Russian” for “Soviet” in the Kennan telegram, and we see substantiation for the Prime Minister’s conclusion:

“Soviet policy, as Department implies in its query under reference, is conducted on two planes: (1) official plane represented by actions undertaken officially in name of Soviet Government; and (2) subterranean plane of actions undertaken by agencies for which Soviet Government does not admit responsibility.”

Kennan’s perspective is also applicable to current Russian diplomatic “objectives.”

“(e) Everything possible will be done to set major Western Powers against each other. Anti-British talk will be plugged among Americans, anti-American talk among British. Continentals, including Germans, will be taught to abhor both Anglo-Saxon powers. Where suspicions exist, they will be fanned; where not, ignited. No effort will be spared to discredit and combat all efforts which threaten to lead to any sort of unity or cohesion among other [apparent omission] from which Russia might be excluded. Thus, all forms of international organization not amenable to Communist penetration and control, whether it be the Catholic [apparent omission] international economic concerns, or the international fraternity of royalty and aristocracy, must expect to find themselves under fire from many, and often [apparent omission].”

Using the evaluation offered above by Ambassador Kennan, the negative diplomatic reaction to the US President’s failure to mention Article 5 of the NATO agreement last June is more understandable.

Among the recommendations there’s this paragraph from the 1946 document which should remind us that “America Alone” is not the best way to face the Russian regime:

(2) Gauged against Western World as a whole, Soviets are still by far the weaker force. Thus, their success will really depend on degree of cohesion, firmness and vigor which Western World can muster. And this is (?) factor which it is within our power to influence.

“Cohesion, firmness, and vigor” should be a matter of collective response between and among western nations if Russian policy is to be thwarted, not a policy of disengagement with our allies.

Kennan’s last recommendation is poignant and compelling:

(5) Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After Al, (?) the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.

I’d highly recommend going to the link for the entire document, and taking a few moments to give serious consideration to its insights, and applicability to today’s diplomatic situation.

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