The voting records of Nevada Representatives Amodei, Heck, and Hardy are recorded here, on roll call votes 491-494. Unfortunately, those votes are almost perfectly predictable. Their explanations even more so.
It takes something, I’m not sure what, to oppose an agreement which intends to curtail Iran’s capacity to develop a nuclear arsenal. However, Nevada representatives Amodei (NV2), Heck (NV3), and Hardy (NV4) have whatever that is.
Representative Amodei has nothing specific to say about his votes on “the Deal,” Representative Cresent Hardy (R-BundyLand) made this statement in his press release:
“Americans have learned for themselves that this deal puts the region and the global community at risk. It amounts to inadequate inspections, a frightening implementation timeline, and provides $150 billion in sanctions relief to the world’s single largest state sponsor of terrorism.
Under this agreement, Iran will be allowed to pursue intercontinental ballistic missiles after eight years and conceivably attack any nation in the world. Worse still, in 15 years the regime will have all limitations on uranium enrichment removed. If Iran is only two or three months away from devising a nuclear weapon today, imagine how close will they be with a robust economy and no enrichment limitations?
Supporters contend that we should accept a bad deal over no deal. This is a false choice. We owe it to the American people and future generations to do everything we can to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran.
This deal fails miserably.” (emphasis added)
Logic fails to adequately analyze this statement. However, there’s more, from Representative (Running for Senate) Heck:
“My initial concerns with the deal stem from the fact that we caved on anytime-anywhere nuclear site inspections, even giving Iran a say in which sites get inspected, and that the deal lifts the conventional arms embargo on Iran. According to reports, Russia and China were the two biggest proponents of lifting that embargo, no doubt to pursue their own nefarious purposes and regional ambitions.” One thing this deal will not change is Iran’s continued sponsorship of terrorist groups in the Middle East and their influence peddling in Iraq. Those aren’t qualities I look for in a partner on an agreement over nuclear weapons development. In the past Iran has not adhered to international norms and obligations when it comes to their nuclear program, and so Congress now has a chance to review this deal and every aspect of this agreement.” [Heck]
Yes, if it isn’t to be THIS deal then what deal might have been possible? At least Heck’s statement is slightly more specific than Hardy’s talking point spew. But taken together they represent the usual oppose anything anytime strategy of the Republican in Congress, even if the outcome of an executive action is positive. Nor, do they make any common sense.
Representative Hardy is concerned that under the terms of the agreement Iran will develop nuclear weapon capacity in eight to fifteen years. Let’s inject the specter of the current situation – before the “freeze” during negotiations spurred by the sanctions, and without an agreement:
“In the absence of this agreement, the most likely outcome would be that the parties resume doing what they were doing before the freeze began: Iran installing more centrifuges, accumulating a larger stockpile of bomb-usable material, shrinking the time required to build a bomb; the U.S. resuming an effort to impose more severe sanctions on Iran.” [Atlantic]
So instead of a timeline stretched out to 8 to 15 years to build the bomb, Iran could go back to its pre-negotiations strategy – continue to install, accumulate, and develop on a timeline that puts it about two months from nuclear weapons capacity. How this puts the region and “global community” at less risk is frankly beyond me. And we’ve covered this territory before. Someone needs to ask: What kind of unilateral sanctions would be so effective that Iran would agree to stop nuclear weapon development in 60 days?
What do we know about sanctions? Let’s Review: “Since 1973, the last quarter-century, only 17 percent of U.S. sanctions have worked. That’s whether they’re unilateral or multilateral. But less than one in five of the cases we have applied have, according to our scoring system, had positive effect.” And, “They almost never work when they are applied unilaterally rather than multilaterally, which in these days is almost always the norm. There is no case—repeat, no case—where unilateral sanctions have ever worked to induce a sizable country to make a major change in policy, no case in history that we have been able to discover.” [DB/Bergsten]
Representative Hardy is quoting all the right GOP talking points, especially the one about rejecting a bad deal over no deal. Whatever that’s supposed to mean because there is no other deal. And, no deal puts the Iranians right back on track to build their nuclear weapons in the next 60 days.
Representative Heck complains that the U.S. “caved” on anytime, anywhere inspections. However, when 2/3rds of Iran’s current centrifuges are eliminated and 98% of its enriched uranium stockpile is gone, that puts an effective stop to the program. As for “ultra-secret, really really really secret, so secret we don’t know about them” installations – how is the United States, or the allies, or the IAEA supposed to know what it can’t know? Remember, if Iran violates the deal the current sanctions snap back into place for ten years with the option on the part of the allies to hold those sanctions in place for another five.
Perhaps Representative Heck isn’t familiar with the inspection elements, which include the continuous monitoring of: uranium mining and milling, uranium conversion, uranium enrichment, fuel manufacturing, nuclear reactors, spent fuel, and “suspicious locations.” What’s not covered under “suspicious locations?”
Representative Heck’s next point, that we’re not dealing with a suitable partner in these negotiations because Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism, begs for an answer to at least one question: If we never negotiated with those who do things we don’t like – then how do we get them to stop doing those things? There are two options – negotiate or go to war. Which answer does Representative Heck prefer?
Laboring Under Delusions
All three of the Republican Representatives from Nevada appear to be laboring under some non-productive delusions.
The first delusion, noted above, is that somehow economic sanctions form a third option in international relations. And, as noted previously, they don’t. Only 17% have had positive results since 1973, and they’ve almost never been effective when applied unilaterally. For example: Cuba.
The second delusion, is that someone, anyone, other than President Obama, could have negotiated a better deal. This isn’t only “our deal.” The agreement was worked out by representatives from the U.S., the U.K., France, China, Russia, and Germany – along with the European Union. And yes, the Chinese and the Russians may have their own agendas, but so do we, the French, the British, the Germans, and the representatives of the European Union. To act as if a treaty or agreement is only valid if and only if the U.S. gets everything it wants, when it wants it, is to render this country an outlier in international relations. The results are splintered relationships and doubts on the part of our allies that we’d ever negotiate in good faith about much of anything.
The third delusion is that past behavior – in this case on the part of Iran – is always predictive of future behavior under different circumstances. Here’s one central example of the changed circumstances:
“There are also aspects of the deal that Iran can’t easily undo. Iran must dismantle two-thirds of its installed centrifuges, remove 98% of its uranium stockpile, and permanently alter the Arak Plutonium reactor before it receives any relief from economic sanctions. These actions will be verified by the IAEA and will greatly increase the time it would take Iran to obtain weapons-grade nuclear material.” [ACC]
There will perhaps always be those who will cry that this doesn’t change the circumstances “enough” – whatever the standard might be — but, that opinion doesn’t challenge the fact that the circumstances have changed, and inspection regimes will be far more comprehensive than any suggested in the past, and will have far more force because the negotiations were not unilateral or regional. (Those wanting additional information about the timeline of negotiations between European countries, the Russians, the Chinese, and the American might want to start here for background information. )
The fourth delusion is that “going it alone,” and “packing big heat,” makes the U.S. look stronger. We might more politely refer to this as the Militarist Option, wherein we swagger upon the international stage threatening to bomb into gravel piles those who annoy us. This, of course, isn’t strength, it’s bullying, and we know bullies don’t approach their interpersonal issues from a position of personal strength.
However much opponents of the non-proliferation deal may ignore facts, distort provisions, and rail on about negotiations with our enemies, the deal is done. All they can do now is whine and enjoy the benefits?