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The Wail Street Bail Out is a bitter pill for independently minded Nevadans to swallow – in part or as a whole. However, for all intents and purposes it is, indeed, the only real game in town. There are some interesting, and possibly useful, proposals on the table, but most are too little and all are too late. First, a brief review:
The current mess is a direct result of too many investors crammed into too narrow a market. The Bush Administration emphasis on the Ownership Society helped attract capital into the housing market, and the Bush Administration’s disinclination to actually do any real oversight contributed to the Wail Street Blues after all the mortgages had been sliced, diced, and sold off in packages – the losses in which to be “insured” by credit default swaps, and other arcania. This situation fuels the public’s distaste for bailing out the idiots who erected this house of cards (paper.)
The central question: The aforementioned idiots built their houses of paper (AIG, Bear Sterns, Lehman Bros. Merrill Lynch, Washington Mutual, IndyMac, etc.) on foundations of highly leveraged positions. Translation – they had way too much questionable debt on their books. In the case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac they started to “eat their own” paper, like the investment banks they bought up the asset based securities. Now, the central question is – How much are these asset based securities worth? Are they only worth the fire sale prices at best 30 cents on the dollar? Are they worth the ‘hold to maturity’ price, given that only about 24% of subprime mortgages are in real trouble, and even fewer of the Alt-A or Prime mortgages are subject to foreclosure. Herein lie the problems with the so-called alternatives.
Personally, I’m all in favor of ripping the cords off the Golden Parachutes, and taking a long hard look at the way publicly traded corporations remunerate their officers. However, that doesn’t address the central question: How much are the asset based securities on the books worth? The corner office crews who bought asset based securities at Merrill Lynch, Lehman Bros., Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Bear Sterns, are for the most part long gone, leaving others to clean up their memorable messes. The officers at Wachovia [MSNBC] who thought it would be a grand idea to buy Golden West – up to its nose in the real estate market – deserve all the vilification they can get. But, vilification doesn’t come close to answering that nagging question – how much are the derivatives worth?
As long as there are derivatives on the books that require the corporations to de-leverage their firms, AND the value of those derivatives is an unknown, there will be a stopper in the flow of money to be borrowed. How can an officer at any of these financial institutions intelligently de-leverage (decrease the debt) his or her company without any idea what the ABSs are really worth? What other firm would buy the ABSs without a clear idea of their actual value? Answer – no one in his or her right mind.
I’m also in favor of making it easier on those 74% of the subprime mortgage holders who are keeping up with their payments, and the Alt-A and Prime Mortgage holders who are doing likewise. Obviously, the more the current holders of mortgages can stay out of the foreclosure process the better – and the more Asset Based Securities containing those mortgages will be worth. Suggestions that Congress improve the Bankruptcy laws, and provide assistance to mortgage holders, are good ideas and should be explored to insure that the current credit crunch doesn’t continue to metastasize. Once again – for all the good that is intrinsic in these proposals they do not answer that nagging inquiry – how much are the current ABSs worth? Supporting mortgage holders is good. Supporting mortgage holders may contain the problem and cause more firms to be interested in purchasing the ABSs, thereby increasing their value – but increasing from What?
One of the actions that should come as a result of this chaotic morass is a requirement that lending institutions limit their leverage ratios. The Bush Administration action to allow five firms to leverage up to 40:1 was not only silly, it was downright tragic. That said, bringing the debt to asset ratios down to a more reasonable 12:1 doesn’t help when it isn’t known what the One is worth.
Nine days into the chaos the House Republicans authored their version, saying that the Federal government shouldn’t purchase ABSs but rather the Treasury Department should design a system to insure mortgage based securities with the securities holders paying premiums to finance the insurance. Fine – but, tell me, how to you “value” the securities on which the insurance is to be purchased? The last time I looked, my homeowners insurance was based on the value of my home. How is an institution supposed to purchase insurance on assets the value of which is undetermined? How is anyone supposed to calculate the premium for insuring assets the value of which no one knows?
Of course, the House Republicans turn next to “injecting capital” by “removing regulatory and tax barriers that are currently blocking private capital formation.” [Crypt] Ah yes, let’s further de-regulate a market that got into this mess in large part because it was so minimally regulated!
Further along, the House Republicans call for “temporary tax relief provisions, …to free up capital,” (nothing new here) and then make this inexplicable recommendation: “Immediate Transparency, Oversight, and Market Reform. Require participating firms to disclose to Treasury the value of their mortgage assets on their books, the value of any private bids within the last year for such assets, and their last audit report.” Any firm can disclose the “value of their mortgage assets on their books,” just like I can tell you that I think my living room furniture is worth a million dollars. Any firm can report “the value of any private bids,” if indeed there are any. This suggestion seems to address solving the problem by ignoring the fact that it exists. The value of the mortgage assets on the books is a function of their value in the market, and if there is no market then there is no value. In the parlance of the business reporters, these assets are “illiquid” meaning no one wants to buy them. We are right back to square one: How much are these mortgage based securities worth? Little wonder Treasury Secretary Paulson rejected the House GOP plan as unworkable.
There are things that can, and probably should, be done as the Congress works through the Debt Debacle. CEO’s need their wings clipped, homeowners need some assistance staying out of the foreclosure process, financial institutions need to be more open and forthcoming about their businesses, rating agencies need to be supervised, exotic financial instruments need to be regulated, and the Federal regulatory agencies need to develop some spine. While all of these outcomes would improve our economic situation, none answer the specific and immediate cause of our financial meltdown – How do we determine the value of the mortgage based securities clogging the books of our financial institutions?
As much as it pains me to say so, the only plan on the table to establish a value is that presented by Secretary Paulson. He will no doubt not get the blank check he originally had in mind, and he will probably have to accept some regulatory provisions he may find unappealing – but he will get the chance to see if the Treasury Department can devise a way to answer what has thus far been unanswerable – how much are those financial artery clogging assets really worth?
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